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Abstract: In times of high and persistent unemployment, it has become one of the most 
important policy tasks in many developed countries to trigger a process of sustained 
employment growth. An illustrative example is the policy of regional “growth-poles”, which 
assumes that a local concentration of a specific industry in a limited geographical area will 
lead to a growth take-off. The theoretical rationale for this type of regional policy can be 
knowledge spillovers, whose importance for the economic (employment) growth has been 
emphasised in the endogenous growth literature.  
Yet, there is a considerable debate about the precise nature of knowledge spillovers. Do the 
externalities accrue between sectors (Jacobs-externalities), or are they rather intra-sectoral 
(MAR-externalities)? Apart from the question what local economic structure is conducive for 
employment growth, an equally important issue concerns the timing of the impact of 
externalities. Is it the current economic structure that matters for employment growth, or 
rather the historical economic structure? If the former turns out to be the case, regional 
policies might become effective immediately. In the latter case the impact of policy might be 
slower but also longer lasting.  
In this paper we study the dynamics of local employment growth in West Germany from 1980 
to 2001. Using dynamic panel techniques, we analyse the nature and the timing of Jacobs- and 
Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities, as well as the impact of general human capital 
spillovers. Jacobs-externalities are stronger in manufacturing than in services, the opposite is 
true for MAR-externalities. General human capital spillovers are only found in 
manufacturing. The influence of all forms of externalities rapidly decays in time, suggesting 
that they are rather static than dynamic. Additionally, we look at the impact of competition, 
general agglomeration effects and overly high regional wages on local employment growth.  
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1) Introduction 
In times of high and persistent unemployment, it has become one of the most important policy 
tasks in many developed countries to trigger a process of sustained employment growth. 
There is a variety of policy instruments at the national level that can be used trying to achieve 
this goal. Yet, at the same time most OECD countries are characterised by massive intra-
national disparities in their labour market performance. For example, in the European Union 
unemployment rates and employment growth rates differ much stronger within than across 
countries (Suedekum, 2003). Therefore, a policy strategy that takes into account the 
determinants of employment growth at the regional level and then tries to tailor policy 
instruments to foster job creation at a lower geographical scale seems equally important. If the 
specific conditions were known under which certain industries thrive at the local level, this 
would be an important piece of information for policymakers that aim at giving specific 
assistance.  
An illustrative example is the policy of regional “growth-poles”, which assumes that a local 
concentration of a specific industry in a limited geographical area will lead to a growth take-
off (an image often portrayed by the famous Silicon Valley example). The theoretical 
rationale for this type of regional policy can be knowledge spillovers, whose importance for 
economic (employment) growth has been emphasised in the endogenous growth literature 
(Romer, 1986). It is known that knowledge spillovers rapidly decay with distance (Jaffe el al., 
1993; Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996), and thus they will be directly 
relevant for employment growth at the regional level. If spillovers accrue within a sector, the 
policy of “growth poles” is likely to be successful, since productivity will rise when an 
industry is locally concentrated.   
Yet, there is a considerable debate about the precise nature of knowledge spillovers. The 
seminal paper of Glaeser et al. (1992) has argued that externalities accrue between sectors, 
e.g. through a cross-fertilisation of people from different professional backgrounds. In their 
terminology, they find evidence for “Jacobs-externalities” which are identified by a positive 
effect of a diversified local industrial structure on the growth rate of an industry. On the other 
hand, they find no or even counter-evidence for intra-sectoral “Marshall-Arrow-Romer” 
(MAR) externalities, which form the underpinning of the “growth pole” strategy. This finding 
has been challenged by Henderson et al. (1995), who find a positive growth impact of local 
overrepresentation.  
  2Apart from the question what local economic structure is conducive to employment growth, 
an equally important question concerns the timing of the impact of externalities. Is it the 
current economic structure that matters for employment growth, or rather some historical 
pattern that determines such things as the “image” or the “business climate” of a specific 
location? If the former turns out to be the case, regional policies might become effective 
immediately. In the latter case the impact of policy might be slower but also longer lasting. 
Although the empirical local employment growth literature has considerably grown in recent 
years (see Overman/Combes, 2004 for a recent survey), very little has been done on the 
timing issue. The conventional approach in this literature is to compute a cross-section of 
growth rates for several local industries and regress these on base year variables that reflect 
the historical local economic conditions. If evidence for externalities is found, they are 
thought of as being “dynamic”, since the local structure from 10-30 years ago matters. 
However, these approaches do not provide a real test whether externalities are dynamic, but 
assume this from the very beginning. To sort out whether externalities are static or dynamic, 
one needs data on local industries for many consecutive years in order to make full use of the 
three dimensions of the panel (location, industry, time period) and test for the relevant lag 
structure. An additional advantage of panel techniques is the possibility to control for time 
invariant industry and location fixed effects that can not be easily distinguished from 
externalities in a cross-section analysis.  
The high data requirements have prevented most researchers from conducting such an 
analysis. In our view there are two notable exceptions. The first is Henderson (1997), who can 
draw on a 14-year panel (1977-1990), covering employment in 5 manufacturing industries 
across US urban counties. Using a dynamic panel model he finds evidence both for MAR- 
and Jacobs-externalities. The relevant lag structure is 6-7 years in the former and an even 
longer time horizon in the latter case. The second important contribution comes from Combes, 
Magnac and Robin (2004), who study the employment growth of 36 different (manufacturing 
and service) industries in 341 French local areas between 1984 and 1993. This paper extends 
the approach of Henderson (1997) in various directions. Firstly, the analysis is not restricted 
to manufacturing sectors and city employment, and thus issues of sample selection do not 
arise. Secondly, they show that the specification of MAR-externalities in Henderson (1997) is 
problematic and leads to an overstatement of their impact. And lastly, they decompose total 
employment within a local industry into average plant size and the number of plants, thereby 
distinguishing between the growth of existing plants and the creation of new plants. Turning 
to the results, they find that it is actually the current economic structure that matters for 
  3growth. Hence, externalities appear to be static in the French case. Moreover, they are 
predominantly of the Jacobs-type.  
In this paper we analyse the nature and the timing of externalities in West German 
(manufacturing and service) industries. Apart from providing novel evidence for another 
country, Europe’s largest economy after all, we add to the empirical local employment growth 
literature in various respects. Firstly, we can draw on a comprehensive and very accurate data 
set that forms a balanced panel, covering the complete population of full-time employees in 
West Germany from 1980 to 2001. The data is disaggregated into 326 local districts and 28 
different industries. To our knowledge this is the most comprehensive, most recent and 
longest panel data set that has been used so far. Next, unlike previous studies we have 
information about the qualification structure of the workforces in the different local industries. 
According to theory, human capital is a major determinant of economic growth, and thus 
controlling for this factor is worthwhile for its own sake. But more than that, we can thereby 
develop an understanding of the relative importance of Jacobs- and MAR-externalities versus 
general human capital spillovers that do not depend on the local economic structure. Lastly, 
we also have information on wages that we will use in the empirical analysis, but in a more 
elaborate way compared to other studies that have included wages (or wage growth rates). If 
at all, unsettled wages were directly plugged into the employment growth regression (e.g. 
Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson et al., 1995). We argue that using unsettled wages can be 
quite misleading, since there can be important static differences in labour productivity across 
locations and industries that give rise to normal wage disparities across the single units. 
Therefore we propose a methodology (similar to Blien and Suedekum, 2004b) to correct 
wages for these effects and include only a measure of “excessive regional wages” in the 
employment growth analysis. This measure captures the trade-off between cost push and 
potentially offsetting demand side effects.  
Briefly previewing our results, we find that the timing of externalities is in fact a crucial issue 
in West Germany. Externalities seem to have primarily a short-run effect, i.e. they appear to 
be static rather than dynamic. Concerning their nature we find clear evidence for Jacobs-
externalities. MAR-externalities also play a role as local employment growth in West 
Germany exhibits mean reversion. But there is considerable inertia that can be thought of as 
being due to the positive effects of specialization. The results hold irrespective of the fact that 
we control for human capital intensity, which itself also has a positive impact on employment 
growth. The effect of “excessive wages” is, as expected, negative yet not strongly significant.  
  4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our empirical model 
and the data set in greater detail, and we discuss our specification of variables. The results are 
presented in section 3. Section 4 provides a conclusion.  
2) The model 
2.1.  The basic model 
In this paper, we rely on the following estimation equation that represents a dynamic panel 
setup.  
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,, zst emp  is the log scale of industry s in area z at time t.  ,, zst emp −l is the lagged dependent 
variable,   are the (current or lagged) time variant characteristics (in logs) that are 
discussed at length below.
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the methodology proposed in Henderson (1997). Yet, it takes serious the critique of Combes, 
Magnach and Robin (2004) concerning the specification of MAR externalities (see below).  
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biased and inconsistent because of a correlation between the transformed error term 
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where  . ,, ,, ,, 1 zst zst zst emp emp emp −− ∆=− ll
2 This transformation makes it possible to use 
values of   (lagged twice or more) as instruments (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). Crucial for the validity of these potential instruments is the assumption 
about the order of autocorrelation of the error term. Under the assumption of serially 
t s z emp , ,
 
1 Note that our data set does not allow to observe employment at the plant level, which prevents us from 
decomposing total employment in cell (z,s,t) into average plant size and number of plants, as in Combes, 
Magnac and Robin (2004). 
2  Since empz,s,t is measured in logs, the left-hand side of (2) is (approximately) the employment growth rate. 
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  [ ] ,, ,,' ( | ) 0     ' 1, , zst zst EX t , t ε ∆∆ = ∀ ∈ K T
                                                
. 
 
Test statistics for these assumptions are presented in the result tables. 
 
2.2. Data 
The data for this study is provided by the German Federal Employment Agency 
(Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit). This information is highly reliable official information that is 
used as the basis to determine individual social security contributions. It covers the entire 
territory of West Germany and the complete population of full-time employment relationships 
subject to social security (i.e. excluding civil servants and self-employed individuals) between 
1980 and 2001. Employment is observed in Z=326 NUTS3-districts (“Landkreise” and 
“kreisfreie Städte”)
3 and in 28 different industries. The data refer to the workplace location, 
hence there are no problems with upward biases in the income levels of metropolitan areas 
due to inward commuting. Furthermore, the data is not subject to any censoring.
4 For every 
district-industry and for every year we know  
 
-  the total employment level  
 
-  the employment shares in small (<20 workers), medium-sized (20-99) and large 
(>100) establishments  
 
-  the employment shares of three skill categories (without formal vocational 
qualifications, completed apprenticeship, higher education)
5 
 
-  the average age of the employees 
 
-  the fraction of men 
 
 
3 For obvious historical reasons, East Germany is not part of the analysis. Moreover, we also excluded West 
Berlin from the data. 
4 Censoring is an issue in the data set used by Combes (2000) and Combes, Magnac and Robin (2004), who have 
information at the plant level for France, yet with the limitation that the exact employment figures of plants with 
fewer than 20 employees are not reported. 
5 People for whom no qualification details were available were added to the group without formal qualifications, 
as it is known that they correspond closest in their structure to this group. 
  6-  the average wage income per employee per calendar day, including all bonuses and 
extra payments subject to social security. 
 
Two things should be noted with respect to the income data. Firstly, income levels that exceed 
the threshold for social security contributions are reported with this value. Our data therefore 
understates the true wage dispersion in West Germany. Secondly, although we deflate the 
wages and work with prices of 1977, we are restricted to use a common price deflator for all 
districts (the CPI for West Germany), because price level data and price indices are not 
available on a regional level. 
Although we have data on 28 different industries, we perform our analysis only for 21 of 
them. Specifically, we exclude agriculture, mining and the public sector as well as the basic 
service industries like transportation, household-related services, gastronomy and health care, 
since we reasonably do not expect externalities to matter for these sectors (see Blien and 
Suedekum, 2004a for supportive evidence). We end up with 15 manufacturing industries and 
6 advanced service industries.
6 In the empirical analysis we could estimate industry by 
industry in order to figure out idiosyncratic industrial patterns. However, in order to restrict 
the number of results, we lump all manufacturing and all service industries together and only 
perform global regressions for the two broad classes of activities. 
 
2.3.  Specification of explanatory variables 
In this subsection we discuss our collection of explanatory variables and in particular our 
specification for the different forms of externalities. Recall that in the estimation equation all 




a) Sectoral specific effects 
The sectors we look at have faced a very different development in the observation period. To 
control for pure sector effects such as structural change at the national level, we include the 
total size of sector   across all Z=326 districts without the own regional employment:  s
 
                                                 
6 The 15 manufacturing industries are Electronics, Chemical Industry, Synthetic Material, Nonmetallic Mineral 
Mining, Glass&Ceramics, Primary Metal Manufacturing, Machinery, Automobile, Office Supplies & IT, 
Musical Instruments&Jewellery, Wood-working, Paper & Printing, Leather&Apparel, Food&Tobacco and 
Building&Construction. The advanced services include the sectors Commerce, Finance&Insurance, Business-
Related Services, Education, Leisure-Related Services and Social Services. 
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b) Total regional size 
To capture total market size and agglomeration effects unrelated to the industrial structure, we 
include the total size of region z without the own sectoral employment to avoid endogeneity.  
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where S denotes the total number of manufacturing/service industries This variable is 
commonly used in the literature. One must be very careful, however, how to measure MAR-
externalities when both the total area employment, equation (4), and the (lagged) employment 
level of the district-industry is included.  
 
c) MAR externalities 
The usual measure for MAR externalities is a local employment share of industry s. But the 
employment share of industry s in area z is perfectly collinear with the employment level 
 and total area employment  . Thus, one can not include all three elements as 
explanatory variables, as Combes (2000) has shown. An alternative indicator for the presence 
of MAR externalities is the (size of the) coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. 
,, zst emp , zt size
As argued by Combes, Magnac and Robin (2004) the auto-regressive parameter in (2) can be 
used to test for MAR-externalities, as it indicates whether a local industry grows faster in 
environments with strong past growth performance. Strictly speaking, there is only evidence 
for MAR externalities if the estimated coefficient is larger than one, as this would imply an 
explosive growth path of the respective industry. A parameter between zero and one indicates 
that there is mean reversion in the long run, albeit there can be some inertia in the transition 
dynamics towards the long-run target. This inertia, which can be due to specialization and 
thus MAR externalities, is stronger the larger (closer to one) the coefficient.  
 
d) Jacobs externalities 
Most of the former studies have used a variant of the commonly used Herfindahl-Hirshman 
index to test Jacobs-externalities. For example, Combes (2000) has suggested the following 
  8specification that was later also used in Combes, Magnac and Robin (2004) and in Blien and 
Suedekum (2004a).  
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This measure increases with local diversity faced by sector s. It reaches a maximum when all 
surrounding industries account for an identical employment share. A positive coefficient 
associated with  ,, zst HHI  would thus signal Jacobs-externalities, as sector s faces a more 
balanced local industrial environment. But there is an identification problem when using 
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The diversification effect could not be identified from the total regional employment, as can 
be seen by comparing (6) with (4) in logs.  
Because of this i we prefer to use an alternative measure for diversification, namely a standard 
Krugman-diversification index which is defined in the following way 
 
 










=− − ∑  (7) 
 
This index sums the absolute differences of the regional and the national employment shares 
of all sectors (except for the one under consideration). It takes on the value of zero if the 
surrounding local economic structure exactly mirrors the average national structure, and it is 
stronger negative the more idiosyncratic (and less diversified) the district z. It uses a different 
reference structure than the HHI (the national average structure instead of a setting with 
identical employment shares), and it is not flawed with comparable identification problems.  
 
  9e) Competition 
A related debate that is often taken up in the empirical local growth literature is how the 
degree of local competition influences the process of knowledge creation and thus, ultimately, 
growth. If single industries are strongly monopolised within a region, then rents might be 
easier defendable and can subsequently be reinvested in further R&D. On the other hand, as 
argued e.g. by Porter (1990), competition might be more growth friendly than monopoly, 
since firms might face a stiffer pressure to innovate. To test this “Porter effect” one would 
typically like to use some Herfindahl-Hirshman-index about the market power prevalent in 
any local industry. However, this requires data at the plant level that is not available in our 
case. To come up with an alternative measure for the degree of local product market 
competition, we use the employment share in small firms with fewer than 20 employees.  
 
  [ ] ,, ,, ,, 20 zst zst zst competition emp in firms employees emp =<  ,  (8) 
 
Although firm sizes are an imperfect measure for competition (since they might also measure 
internal scale economies), we hope that this variable reflects local product market competition 




Due to data limitations, previous studies did not include information about human capital 
intensity into the empirical analysis. From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of 
education is straightforward for its own sake. Human capital spillovers that directly affect the 
level of TFP are common practise in growth theory by now (see e.g. Lucas, 1988; Burda and 
Wyplosz, 1992). But they become especially interesting if one thinks about these general 
human capital spillovers, which were traditionally not seen in relation to the local economic 
structure, in combination with MAR- and Jacobs-externalities. The rationale for these 
interaction-based knowledge spillovers is communication of workers either within the own 
industry (MAR) or across industries (Jacobs). One would typically think that knowledge 
spillovers will be more relevant when educated workers communicate with each other. On the 
other hand, human capital externalities might also be general and independent of the 
prevailing local economic structure. To sort this out, we include the employment share of 
college educated workers. 
 
  10  ,, ,, ,, zst zst zst education high skilled emp =  ,  (9) 
 
This variable simply measures the human capital intensity of a local industry. It allows us to 
see the relative importance of externalities that depend on the local economic structure, versus 
such human capital externalities that are generally present independent of other industries in 
the respective region.  
 
g) Wages 
Lastly, we include a wage measure into our list of explanatory variables. As argued in the 
introduction we will not simply use raw wages, but rather use a methodology (described at 
length in Blien and Suedekum, 2004b) that allows us to isolate a measure of “excessive 
regional wages”. To do so, we take a preceding step and regress the average (log) wage in 
every sector, region and year ( ) on a variety of explanatory variables like the 
qualification, age and gender structure of the respective workforce that determine labour 
productivity. From this analysis we take the regional fixed effects and include them in main 
regressions (1) and (2). That is, a “high wage region” in our interpretation is not a region with 
high wages per se, but a region whose wages are higher than expected, given a variety of 
characteristics. That is, we estimate period-by-period the following wage regression 
,, zst wage
 
  ,, 1 ,,) ln( sz s t z st z i r t wage a W S X β ε − + ′ ′′ ′ ′ = ++ + (10) 
 
where   is the matrix of observable characteristics of the respective local industry (firm 
size structure, qualification etc.), 
,, 1 zst X − ′
s S′ is an industry fixed effect and  z W′ a location fixed effect. 
We estimate (10) subject to the restriction that all regional fixed effects, weighted by the 
aggregate employment share of regional over total national employment, must sum up to zero. 
This method, which is simply a normalization that does not affect the relative size of any two 
regional fixed effects, is useful since it allows us to interpret the values of   as percentage 
deviations from a national grand mean of zero, not in relation to some arbitrarily omitted 
reference category from the complete (and thus, perfectly multicollinear) set of regional 
dummies. Economically, the variable 
z W′
z W′ can be understood as a measure that shows how 
wages in region z differ from what should be observed, given a variety of characteristics. 
“High wage” and a “low wage” regions are characterised by values of   that are 
significantly higher (lower) than zero. In our view, this is a more meaningful measure than the 
z W′
  11raw average regional wage, as used e.g. in Henderson (1997), since it controls for static 




We estimate our empirical model separately for the manufacturing sector (15 industries) and 
the advanced services sector (6 industries). We report the results of a parsimonious model 
specification in table 1a, where we include two lags of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables with up to two lags. That is, we specify an autoregressive distributed 
lag model, ADL(2,2), as laid out e.g. in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004:577). The results are 
robust with respect to different specification tests.  
For instrumenting the first difference of the lagged dependent variable we use higher order 
time lags of the dependent variable in levels (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In table 1b we 
provide the results of diagnosis tests for the validity of instruments. The Sargan-test can not 
be rejected at the 5% level for manufacturing (p=0.080) and for services (p=0.098).
7 The 
other null hypothesis that is necessary for the validity of instruments, serial uncorrelated error 
terms t s z , , ε , can not be rejected at conventional significance levels. We conclude that we can 
use   with   as valid instruments.  ) log( , , l t s z emp − 2 ≥ l
 
3.1. Manufacturing 
In manufacturing industries, both Jacobs- and MAR-externalities matter in the short run. The 
contemporaneous coefficient for diversity is positive (0.180) and significantly different from 
zero. The same is true for the endogenous variable lagged by one period. The coefficient is 
smaller than one, so we can not expect an explosive growth path. Yet, the size of the 
coefficient (0.840) suggests that the mean reversion process exhibits considerable inertia, 
which can be thought of as being due to the positive effects of regional specialization.  
One has to note that the effect of the independent variables quickly fades away with time. The 
impact of all variables (except for wages) is insignificant with a time lag of two or more 
periods. This agrees with the conclusion of Combes, Magnac and Robin (2004) for the case of 
France, who also find that externalities are mainly static. It stands in contrast to the conclusion 
                                                 
7 It is commonly known from Monte Carlo studies (e.g. Hansen et al., 1996) that the Sargan-test rejects the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments too easily. Hence, given the strong support we get from the autocorrelation test, 
we do not worry too much about the low p-value of the Sargan-test.  
  12of Henderson (1997) that externalities seem to have a more long-run effect in the United 
States, with a lag of six years or more.  
 
Table 1a:  Results Dynamic Panel Estimation  
  
Dep.Variable: y(t)                                                TIME Dummies: YES 
   Manufacturing Services 
number of groups  4717 1955 
0,840*** 0,869*** 
y    t-1  (0,000) (0,000) 
-0,079 -0,006 
t-2  (0,392) (0,958) 
0,155*** 0,079* 
size     t  (0,002) (0,066) 
-0,096* -0,030 
t-1  (0,087) (0,502) 
0,033 0,043 
t-2  (0,459) (0,201) 
0,539*** 0,836*** 
sect     t  (0,000) (0,000) 
-0,321*** -0,742*** 
t-1  (0,000) (0,000) 
0,058 0,038 
t-2  (0,450) (0,761) 
-0,049*** -0,322*** 
competition     t  (0,000) (0,000) 
0,042*** 0,312*** 
t-1  (0,000) (0,000) 
0,008 0,026 
t-2  (0,373) (0,539) 
0,180*** 0,095*** 
diversity     t  (0,000) (0,002) 
-0,145*** -0,049* 
t-1  (0,000) (0,077) 
0,043 -0,0141 
t-2  (0,159) (0,540) 
-0,067 -0,050 
wages     t  (0,531) (0,557) 
0,109 0,148* 
t-1  (0,227) (0,055) 
-0,224** 0,004 
t-2  (0,011) (0,959) 
0,020*** 0,004 
 education     t  (0,000) (0,173) 
-0,014*** -0,012*** 
t-1  (0,000) (0,000) 
0,001 -0,007** 
t-2  (0,777) (0,016) 
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Table 1b: Tests for validity of instruments  
   Manufacturing Services 
Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions 
chi2(17) =    25,74       
Prob > chi2 = 0,0794 
chi2(17) =    24,85      
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0981 
AB-test that average autocovariance  
in residuals of order 1 is 0. 
H0: no autocorrelation 
z = -18,09    
Pr > z = 0,0000 
z =  -6,63    
Pr > z = 0,0000 
AB-test that average autocovariance  
in residuals of order 2 is 0 
H0: no autocorrelation 
z =   1,13    
Pr > z = 0,2577 
z =   0,81    
Pr > z = 0,4200 
 
In particular, the positive sign of the contemporaneous coefficient for total regional size 
shows global agglomeration advantages or positive market size effects. On the other hand, we 
find no evidence for Porter externalities, as the sign of the contemporaneous coefficient for 
competition is even significantly negative. This result should be treated cautiously, because 
firm size structures are not a perfect measure for product market competition.  
Concerning the education variable, we find a significantly positive impact on employment 
growth. This finding is consistent with general human capital spillovers, as emphasised in the 
endogenous growth literature. Interestingly, these general effects of education seem not to 
interfere with the Jacobs- and MAR-externalities that depend on the local economic structure, 
as an elimination of the education variable leaves the qualitative conclusions with respect to 
the other control variables unchanged. 
Finally, the short run impact of overly high regional wages is negative, but not significant. 
Recall that we have constructed a measure for “overly high” regional wages, which should 
have a negative impact on employment growth according to neoclassical arguments. On the 
other hand, high regional wages also point to a higher purchasing power of local consumers, 
which might have positive demand-side effects on employment growth (see e.g. Jerger and 
Michaelis, 2003). We interpret the negative but non-significant coefficient in table 1a such 
that cost push effects dominate over potential demand side effects, but that the latter offset the 
former to an extent that renders the relationship between wages and employment growth 
insignificant.
8  
As argued above, the impact of externalities in West Germany appears to be mainly static. 
However, we also check if there is a long-run impact. Given the ADL-specification, the long-
                                                 
8 This conclusion is in accordance with the findings of Suedekum and Blien (2004), who look at the relation 
between wages and employment growth in West Germany (1993-2001) by means of a shift-share regression 
technique. There, the wage effect is broken down according to single industries. For a subset of industries it is 
insignificant, but for some it is significantly negative. 
 
  14run effects on employment growth can be determined by computing (for each independent 
variable) the following coefficient δ* (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004:577) 






















where δl are the coefficients for the lagged independent variables Xz,s,t, and ρp for the lagged 
dependent variable. The long-run results are reported in table 2, with p-values for the 
significance of the coefficients in parentheses.  
As can be seen, in particular the long-run impact of total regional size has an impact of 
employment growth in manufacturing. The coefficient is positive (0.384) and significantly 
different from zero. This finding is in favour of general agglomeration economies and is well 
consistent with the positive (and still significant) long-run impact of diversity (0.324). Both 
findings can be thought of as supporting dynamic Jacobs-externalities, which corroborates the 
results of Blien and Suedekum (2004a), who conduct the more traditional cross-section 
analysis on dynamic externalities for the case of Germany (1993-2001). 
 
Table 2:  Long-run effects  
 
   Manufacturing Services 
0.384*** 0.838* 
size   (0.005) (0.080) 
0.670*** 1,197*** 
sect  (0.000) (0,000) 
-0.001 0.145 
competition   (0.990) (0.757) 
0.324*** 0.293 
diversity   (0.007) (0.211) 
-0.762 0.934 
wages   (0.300) (0.457) 
0.028*** -0.136 
 education   (0.005) (0.315) 
 
Concerning the long-run impact of the dependent variable, we can provide the result that the 
null hypothesis of a coefficient equal to one can not be rejected at any reasonable level of 
significance. This suggests that MAR externalities do in fact matter in West German 
manufacturing industries, both in the short and in the longer run.  
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3.2. Services 
Going over to the service sector, we find that in the short run both Jacobs- and MAR-
externalities matter (see right column of table 1a). However, the size of the impact of diversity 
(0.095) is considerably smaller as compared to the manufacturing sector (0.180). The same is 
true for the contemporaneous effect of total regional size, which is positive and significant for 
services (0.079), but also smaller than the analogous coefficient for manufacturing (0.155). 
Moreover, there are no significant long-run impacts from diversity (see table 2).  
On the other hand, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is somehow larger in the 
service sector (0.896) than in manufacturing (0.840) and it is also strongly significant. There 
is thus also considerable inertia in the mean reversion process. In the long-run, the null 
hypothesis of an impact equal to one can also not be rejected.  
We therefore conclude that both static and dynamic MAR-externalities are present in West 
German service industries, and they are somewhat stronger than in the manufacturing sector. 
Jacobs-externalities also play some role in the short-run, although the size of the effect is 
smaller than in manufacturing. We find no evidence for ´dynamic´ Jacobs-externalities in the 
service industries. All these findings agree with the cross-section results by Blien and 
Suedekum (2004a). 
With respect to our competition variable we also find a significantly negative short-run effect 
in the service sector, and we suggest an analogous interpretation as for manufacturing. 
Somewhat surprisingly, human capital externalities appear to play a minor role in service 
industries. As for manufacturing, the impact of overly high wages is negative but non-
significant in the short run. The size of the impact is even smaller (-0.050 versus -0.067), 
which suggests that the employment growth effects of overly high wages are less adverse in 
services than in manufacturing. 
 
4.) Conclusion 
The local economic structure is an important determinant of the employment growth 
performance of different industries, but timing is a crucial issue. In West Germany, it is 
predominantly the current (rather than some historical) structure that matters. In the 
terminology of growth theory, we can thus conclude that externalities appear to be more static 
than dynamic. For economic policy this can be good news, because structural interventions 
that influence the industry structure at the local level will have an immediate impact on 
employment growth. According to our estimations, policymakers do not have to wait for 
  16several years before results become visible. On the other hand, the effects of policy might also 
not be long-lasting. Our results show that industries benefit both from local specialization and 
from a diversified and urbanized surrounding environment. The impact of the latter factor is 
more important for manufacturing than for service industries.  
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